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Abstract
We unify two approaches towards identifying native welfare eﬀects of immigration, one
emphasizing the immigration surplus (Borjas, 1995,1999), the other identifying a welfare
loss due to terms-of-trade eﬀects (Davis & Weinstein, 2002). We decompose the native
welfare eﬀect of immigration into the standard complementarity eﬀect, augmented by
a Stolper-Samuelson eﬀect, and a terms-of-trade eﬀect. Using a structural model with
three skill-classes we derive propositions on the wage and native welfare eﬀects of various
immigration scenarios. A calibration-based simulation reveals that the size of the inﬂow
and immigrant income repatriation are key determinants of the welfare-ranking of diﬀerent
immigration scenarios.
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In academic immigration research, economists have mainly concentrated on two questions.
How does immigration aﬀect wages and the functional distribution of income in the re-
ceiving country? And how does it aﬀect aggregate welfare of the “politically relevant”
group of natives, i.e. those who ultimately shape domestic immigration policies? The
ﬁrst question has been tackled in an impressive number of econometric analyses carried
out on wage data from diﬀerent countries and spanning diﬀerent time periods. Evidence
on the mass migration period of 1870-1913 indicates a profound impact on real wages,
contributing signiﬁcantly to international convergence; see O’Rourke & Williamson (1999)
and Chiswick & Hatton (2003). Studies on post-World-War-II migration have lead to a
consensus view that immigration tends to lower wages of competing native workers, but
that the eﬀect is small, sometimes even tiny.1 However, Borjas (1999) identiﬁes concep-
tual and econometric problems in this empirical literature, and in Borjas (2003) he uses
ar e ﬁned approach to arrive at much larger eﬀects. His results indicate that an 11 per-
cent increase in US labor supply, as induced by immigration between 1980 and 2000, has
depressed average US wages by about 3 percent.
On the second question, there is wide-spread optimism that immigration yields a posi-
tive aggregate welfare eﬀect in the host country, based on a complementarity relationship
between immigrants and some domestic factors. Typically, this “immigration surplus”
is demonstrated in a stylized two-factor, one-sector model, and its magnitude derived by
means of calibration-based simulations. Thus, Borjas (1995,1999) calculates for the US
that a stock of immigrants equal to 12 percent of the native work force yields a native
welfare gain between 0.1 to 0.5 percent of GDP.2 However, the simulation also identiﬁes
factor price eﬀects which are more pronounced than those found in econometric studies.
1See Card (2001) for recent evidence, and the surveys by Borjas (1994), Friedberg & Hunt (1995),
Borjas (1999), and Hanson et al. (2002) for the US and DeNew & Zimmermann (1994) for Europe.
2Similar exercises are found in Razin & Sadka (1997), and Bauer and Zimmermann (1997).
1In a recent paper, Davis and Weinstein (2002) challenge the notion of a positive
immigration surplus. They argue that a large, technologically superior country is likely
to experience a terms-of-trade deterioration from immigration. Calibrating a Ricardian
model to US data, they conclude that a 12 percent stock of immigrant labor has caused a
0.8 to 0.9 percent welfare loss for natives. While terms-of-trade eﬀects have already been
emphasized in earlier literature on migration, see e.g. Ethier (1985), Davis and Weinstein
are the ﬁrst to provide a quantitative welfare assessment in this context.
These two strands of theory are extreme, both in terms of modeling and message.
The positive Borjas-type welfare eﬀect builds on a complementarity relationship between
immigrant labor and domestic factors, largely ignoring trade eﬀects of immigration. In
contrast, the negative eﬀect in Davis & Weinstein derives from an immigration-induced
worsening of the terms-of-trade in a setup that rules out any complementarity eﬀect.
Given the fact that immigration tends to reduce native workers’ wages, and given wide-
spread concern about its ﬁscal costs in connection with the welfare-state,3 advocates of
labor immigration bear a heavy burden of political justiﬁcation. Indeed, a positive immi-
gration surplus almost seems like a necessary condition for any liberal immigration policy
based on economic arguments. Once the importance of welfare considerations is recog-
nized, opposing views, such as that of the Borjas-tradition and the Davis-Weinstein-result,
certainly warrant further investigation.4 This paper proposes an encompassing theoreti-
cal framework where the Borjas- and the Davis-Weinstein-results emerge as special cases.
We identify several channels responsible for the native welfare eﬀect of immigration and
gauge their relative quantitative importance. We allow for diﬀerent degrees of tradability
in factors and goods, ranging from non-tradable goods to perfect integration of capital
markets, and we generalize the complementarity-based approach of the Borjas-type to a
3Welfare-state issues are discussed in Borjas (1994), and more recently in Hanson et al. (2002, ch.12).
4In a similar vein, Borjas (2002, p.298) states that “... the immigration literature has paid remarkably
little attention to the source and magnitude of the economic gains from immigration. This is one area of
study that clearly requires much additional research”.
2setting with many types of labor and endogenous goods prices. This provides for internal
and external adjustment mechanisms which help to bring simulated wage eﬀects closer
into line with empirical estimates. Moreover, we allow for alternative values for trade
elasticities, including extreme cases where a country approaches a closed, or a small open
economy. And ﬁnally, we evaluate the role of immigrant income repatriation, which has
recently caused renewed attention; see Glytsos (2001) and Chami et al. (2003).
The paper abstracts from the welfare-state and any labor market imperfection. This
would seem like a serious omission in the context of international labor mobility. How-
ever, our focus is diﬀerent. Welfare-state issues of immigration are typically treated in
abstracting from, or at least grossly simplifying, structural characteristics that may give
rise, through adjustment forces on goods and factor markets, to an immigration surplus.
The primary aim of our paper is to contribute to a better understanding of how immi-
gration aﬀects natives through these adjustment mechanisms. In proposing a general,
though strictly competitive theoretical framework, we hope to pave the ground for the
subsequent introduction of additional features reﬂecting the welfare-state and labor mar-
ket imperfections. Moreover, our analysis provides a testable link between a country’s
structural characteristics, such as its size and openness to trade, or the skill content of its
trade, and its policy stance on immigration.
The paper is organized in three main sections. In section 2, we propose a general model
relying on duality methods to break the native welfare eﬀect of immigration into an “aug-
mented” immigration surplus, which incorporates Stolper-Samuelson-type repercussions
in addition to the Borjas-type complementarity eﬀect, and a Davis-Weinstein-type terms-
of-trade eﬀect. In a multi-labor setting, we show that the complementarity eﬀect no
longer needs to be positive, and we derive a set of generalized suﬃcient conditions under
which it is. Moreover, we identify conditions under which the complementarity eﬀect is
reinforced by goods price endogeneity.
Section 3 translates the mechanisms identiﬁed in section 2 into a structural model
which facilitates sharper results, and which paves the way for a quantitative assessment.
3Assuming three types of labor — high-skilled labor, labor with a medium skill level, and
unskilled workers — allows us to better reﬂect stylized facts and key aspects of the pol-
icy debate. Introducing a non-tradable good, in addition to tradable goods with ﬁnitely
e l a s t i ce x p o r td e m a n d ,g e n e r a t e sar i c hp a t t e r no fp r i c ee ﬀects. We illustrate the general
equilibrium by means of a novel graphical device which incorporates endogenous price
adjustment, bringing together augmented versions of factor price frontiers and labor de-
mand functions, and generating the Borjas- and the Davis-Weinstein-models as special
cases.
In section 4, we calibrate our model to a “typical” advanced industrialized country and
run simulations for alternative immigration scenarios. The results clearly indicate that the
additional channels introduced in sections 2 and 3 are quantitatively important. Moreover,
we show that cross-country variations in structural characteristics may indeed be relevant
for explaining observed diﬀerences in national immigration policies. More speciﬁcally, we
ﬁnd that (i) for a given skill-composition of immigration, the native welfare eﬀect is non-
monotonic in the size of the inﬂow, (ii) for a given size of the inﬂow, ranking diﬀerent skill-
compositions of immigration with respect to their native welfare eﬀect crucially depends
on whether immigrant income is remitted, and (iii) that this ranking is also dependent on
the size of the inﬂow. The ﬁnal section provides a summary, as well as some normative
conclusions and an outlook on further research.
2 Immigration and welfare: a general treatment
The global economy features a clear hierarchy of markets regarding the type and degree of
internationalization. First, there are non-tradable goods whose prices are determined on
strictly national markets. Their share is shrinking, but they continue to play an impor-
tant role, particularly if immigrant income repatriation drives a wedge between domestic
expenditure and domestically generated income. Second, labor markets remain largely
national, with immigration mainly governed by quotas. Thirdly, markets for tradable
4goods are characterized by low and falling levels of natural barriers, and national policy
discretion is severely limited by international agreements. Hence, unlike wage rates, prices
of tradable goods are determined on international markets. Finally, capital markets fea-
ture a very high degree of international mobility — at least within the set of industrialized
countries — and are governed by parity conditions for risk-adjusted rates of return.
2.1 Native welfare under perfect capital mobility
Motivated by these major divides, we model an economy which produces tradable and
non-tradable goods, using capital and various types of labor. Perfect international capital
mobility means that the economy is price-constrained on capital markets, whereas a quota-
oriented immigration policy implies that it is quantity-constrained on labor markets. The
underlying assumption is that for all types of labor the economy faces foreign supply which
is suﬃciently large and elastic, for any quota within the relevant range to be binding. In
line with our arguments above, free trade reigns on the tradable goods markets.
Assuming a convex technology of production and perfect competition on goods and
factor markets, as well as absence of any other distortion, gross domestic product (GDP),
Y , can be written as the usual maximum value function (“GDP-function”)
Y = y(P
n,P
t,K,L), where K = ¯ K + K
∗ and L = ¯ L + L
∗. (1)
All variables except Y are in vector form, where Pn are prices for non-tradables, and
Pt are domestic prices for tradable goods. ¯ K is a vector of native ownership of diﬀerent
capital capital stocks, while K∗ denotes net foreign capital stocks invested in the domestic
economy. A negative K∗ implies outward foreign investments.5 By analogy, ¯ L denotes
a vector of domestic labor of various types, while L∗ indicates stocks of foreign worker-
residents, reﬂecting past immigration ﬂows. We thus make a clear distinction between
immigration which relates to the ﬂow dL∗,a n dt h estock of foreign worker-residents L∗.
5W eu s eu p p e r - c a s el e t t e r st oi n d i c a t ev a r i a b l e s ,w h i l el o w e r - c a s el e t t e r sa r ef u n c t i o n a ls y m b o l s .
5Diﬀerent types of labor and capital may or may not be speciﬁc to sectors. With convex
technology, y is convex in prices (Pn,Pt), and concave in endowments (K,L).








where Qn and Qt are quantities supplied of non-tradable and tradable goods, and a
subscript index is used to denote a gradient. Competitive capital rentals R and wage
rates W are equal to the corresponding marginal value productivities, i.e.,
R = yK(P
n,P
t,K,L) and W = yL(P
n,P
t,K,L). (3)
Assuming that the number of factors is at least as large as the number of goods, these
derivatives exist and are unique, see Neary (1985). Absent any active trade policy, prices
Pt are equal to world prices. However, in line with Ethier (1985) or Davis & Weinstein
(2002), we allow for Pt to adjust endogenously to immigration.
We assume perfect international capital mobility, whence capital stocks K = ¯ K +
K∗ adjust to satisfy the relevant no-arbitrage conditions. With a given world interest
rate i∗, expressed in terms of some composite consumption good, and abstracting from
depreciation, the rental rates of capital are equal to the steady state user cost, Rj = PKji∗,
where PKj is the acquisition price of type-j capital, relative to the composite consumption
good. In the remainder, we keep R constant at ¯ R. It proofs useful to introduce a price-
constrained revenue function (see Neary, 1985)
g(P
n,P











t feasible, given L = ¯ L + L
∗ and K. (4)
Given perfect capital mobility, our economy is thus price-constrained on capital markets
in that each capital stock adjusts to equate the marginal value productivity of capital
with the user cost, i.e.,
yK(P
n,P
t,K,L)= ¯ R. (5)
This determines endogenous capital stocks K = k(Pn,Pt,L, ¯ R). N o t i c et h a td o m e s t i c
ownership of capital stocks, ¯ K, is no longer relevant for production.






t,L, ¯ R)+ ¯ R ¯ K − WL
∗. (6)
Notice that there is a crucial asymmetry between foreign labor and foreign capital: If
positive, K∗ is a truly foreign factor whose income is always repatriated, while foreign
worker-residents are national factors and therefore part of GNP. Their income may be
remitted, but even if it is not, we do not consider it as native income. This will be
of crucial importance when we turn to the welfare measure below. For capital stocks


















t,L, ¯ R). (8)
In (7), gPj(Pn,Pt,L, ¯ R) are the supply functions of this capital-price-constrained economy,
while gL(Pn,Pt,L, ¯ R) in (8) determines its wage rates for diﬀerent types of labor as
functions of goods prices and the world interest rate, as well as its labor endowment.
From (7) and (8) it follows that the native-income-function for a capital-price-constrained
economy has the same standard properties with respect to goods prices and labor endow-
ments, inclusive of foreign worker-residents, as the GDP-function with exogenous capital
stocks (quantity-constrained economy). In particular, gL(Pn,Pt,L, ¯ R) is homogeneous of
degree zero in L,a n dgLL(Pn,Pt,L, ¯ R) is negative semideﬁnite, as g inherits concavity
in L from y(·) in (1) above. In other words, we may analyze the qualitative eﬀects of
immigration without having to pay attention to the role of capital stocks, provided that
the world interest rate remains constant. However, from the Le Chatelier-Samuelson prin-
ciple, it follows that in quantitative terms the price-constraint on capital stocks makes a
big diﬀerence; see Neary (1985) and section 4 below.
We assume a representative household with an indirect utility function v(Pn,Pt,E),
where E denotes expenditure. Capital income is always repatriated. If immigrant income
is remitted as well, we speak of a “remitted income system” (RIS), else we speak of a “true






















while RIS implies E = y
n(P
n,P
t,L, ¯ R). (9d)









t,L, ¯ R)], (10)
where Y n is native income as deﬁn e di n( 6 )a b o v e . 6 Notice that the deﬁnition of v is the























∗d¯ R − L
∗dW, (13)







∗d¯ R − L
∗dW. (14)
The third line assumes that domestic labor endowment changes only through immigration,
i.e., dL =dL∗.T h em a r g i n a le ﬀect of a change in the world interest rate on native welfare
is given by −PKK∗, which is the value of the overall net foreign capital stock invested in
this economy, whereby K∗ < 0 must be interpreted as domestic capital invested abroad.
Finally, in the fourth line, by deﬁnition we have Qn = Dn.
We now assume that changes in (14) are driven by immigration, dL∗ > 0,a n dt h a t
d¯ R =0 . According to (8), domestic wage rates then follow
dW = gLLdL
∗ + gLP ndP
n + gLPtdP
t, (15)
where gLL = gLL(Pn,Pt,L, ¯ R) is negative semideﬁnite, due to concavity of g in L; see
Neary (1985). The term gLPn = gLPn(Pn,Pt,L, ¯ R) is a matrix of Stolper-Samuelson
eﬀe c t so fg o o d sp r i c e so nw a g e s ,a n da n a l o g o u s l yf o rgLPt = gLPt(Pn,Pt,L, ¯ R).
6In focusing on native rather than on domestic welfare, we follow a tradition established by Bhagwati
& Srinivasan (1983). This choice also reﬂects the fact that immigrants are largely excluded from the
constituency which is relevant for policy, at least at the time of migration, and possibly a signiﬁcant time
thereafter.
82.2 The augmented immigration surplus
In line with the above mentioned hierarchy of markets, we treat dL∗ as a policy variable,
exogenous to our analysis. By way of contrast, dPn and dPt should be seen as endogenous,
driven by dL∗. The next section will introduce a stylized model which facilitates explicit
solution for these price changes for alternative speciﬁci m m i g r a t i o nﬂows dL∗.A t t h i s
stage, we simply write dPn = ϕn
LdL∗ and dPt = ϕt
LdL∗,w h e r eϕn
L and ϕt
L are matrices of
reduced form, general equilibrium derivatives of commodity prices with respect to labor













The ﬁr s tt e r mi ne q u a t i o n( 1 6 )m a yb ec a l l e dt h eaugmented immigration surplus, aug-
mented meaning that the generalized Borjas-type complementarity eﬀect −L∗gLLdL∗ is
combined with a Stolper-Samuelson mechanism relating changes in factor prices to goods
prices, whether for tradable or non-tradable goods. Together with the Davis-Weinstein-
type terms-of-trade eﬀect in the second term, the augmented surplus determines the native
welfare eﬀect of immigration.
The augmented surplus in (16) reveals that native welfare increases if migration
changes domestic wages in such a way that income of domestic non-native workers falls.
The term is zero if L∗ =0 ,r e ﬂecting the second-order ( or infra-marginal) nature of the
eﬀect; see Berry and Soligo (1969). The above representation of this surplus looks at
marginal units of immigration, but explicitly bringing infra-marginal units L∗ into the
picture. In contrast, the terms-of-trade eﬀect is always a ﬁrst-order magnitude. Its sign
depends on whether immigration tends to increase or decrease domestic excess supply of
goods which are exported (Qt − Dt > 0) or imported (Qt − Dt < 0).S u c haﬁrst-order
welfare eﬀect is ruled out for non-tradables, since by deﬁnition we have Qn−Dn =0 .P r i c e
changes for non-tradables aﬀect native welfare only indirectly through their wage-eﬀect
in the augmented immigration surplus.
The coexistence of a ﬁrst-order and a second-order eﬀe c ti m p l i e st h a tt h en a t i v ew e l f a r e
9eﬀect may be non-monotonic in the size of the labor inﬂow, given a certain distribution
over diﬀerent types of labor. This is most clearly seen for the simplest case where immi-
gration is restricted to a single type of labor. The second-order derivative d2V/dL∗2 is
then equal to −(gLL+gLPnϕn
L+gLPtϕt
L),p r o v i d e dw ea c c e p te q u a t i o n( 1 6 )a sal i n e a r i z e d
approximation. Typically, this term is positive. In contrast, an adverse terms-of-trade ef-
fect implies that ϕt
L < 0, so that the diﬀerential (16) is a combination of a convex positive
term and a linear negative term, suggesting a potential for non-monotonicity. Section 4
provides evidence that this type of non-monotonicity is important empirically.
The notion of a positive Borjas-type complementarity eﬀect relies on a presumption
that under certain conditions the term L∗gLLdL∗ is negative. It is a general analogue to
the notion that employment of immigrant labor occurs along a downward-sloping marginal
product (demand) curve.7 We can state a general result emerging from equation (16):
Proposition 1 (generalized complementarity) (i) The generalized Borjas-type com-
plementarity eﬀect, −L∗gLLdL∗, is strictly positive only if the inﬂow of immigrants dL∗
is such that it changes the composition of domestic labor endowment L = ¯ L + L∗. (ii) It
is guaranteed to be positive, if the inﬂow of immigrants dL∗ is such that it leaves the
composition of L∗ unchanged and g is strictly concave in L.
The proof is as follows. If immigration leaves domestic labor endowment ratios unchanged
we have dL∗ = ζ(¯ L + L∗),w h e r eζ is a positive scalar. Since gL(Pn,Pt, ¯ L + L∗, ¯ R) is
homogeneous of degree zero in labor endowments, we have gLLdL∗ = ζgLL(¯ L + L∗)=0 .
This establishes part (i) of the proposition. On the other hand, for immigration to leave
the composition of foreign resident-workers unchanged we must have dL∗ = ξL∗ for some
positive scalar ξ. I nt h i sc a s ew eh a v eL∗gLLdL∗ = ξL∗gLLL∗, which is negative if g is
strictly concave in L. This establishes part (ii) and thus completes the proof.
7This is the classic view of the immigration surplus; see, for instance, Borjas (1995,1999). For a similar
treatment restricted to one type of labor, see Razin & Sadka (2001).
10This proposition substantiates the wide-spread presumption that native factor owners
as a whole gain from any factor inﬂow that occurs in proportions diﬀering from those
prevailing within natives. The standard approach pursued by Borjas (1995, 1999) iden-
tiﬁes the immigration surplus as the eﬀect of a discrete inﬂow of labor. Proposition 1 is
diﬀe r e n ti nt h a ti tl o o k sa tamarginal inﬂow, with a pre-existing stock of foreign workers
already present in the economy. In principle, the standard surplus may be recovered from
the proposition by integrating over L∗, but the marginal perspective gives rise to a new
element. Thus, in contrast to the discrete case, (i) alone is not suﬃcient for the existence
of a positive immigration surplus, due to pre-existing foreign worker-residents L∗.O nt h e
other hand, while (i) plus (ii) together constitute a suﬃcient condition, condition (ii) is
not necessary for the complementarity eﬀect to arise. It merely rules out that additional
immigration boosts wage payments to the existing stock of immigrants via complemen-
tarity, thereby reducing the surplus available to natives. In contrast to the results in
Borjas, the term L∗gLLdL∗ can be positive, even if gLL is strictly concave and the inﬂow
does change the composition of the total labor force. Conversely, this also opens up the
possibility for the Borjas-type complementarity eﬀect to be negative.
Notice that Rybczynski-type internal reallocation of labor may allow the economy to
absorb dL∗ at unchanged marginal value productivities gL, in which case L∗gLLdL∗ =0 .
Hence, proposition 1 requires strict concavity in (ii), as this rules out such ﬂat segments
of the general equilibrium labor demand functions. The next section will turn to a special
model where strict concavity is guaranteed through sector-speciﬁcity of factors.
The terms gLPnϕn
LdL∗ and gLPtϕt
LdL∗ in equation (16) augment the Borjas-type com-
plementarity eﬀect by changes in wage rates that are associated with goods price ad-
justments via the Stolper-Samuelson-relationship. Notice that ϕt
L are general equilibrium
derivatives of prices with respect to labor endowments. There is an alternative way of
interpreting these augmentation terms. Since gPtL and gPnL give the Rybczynski-eﬀect
of endowment changes on the outputs of tradable and non-tradable goods, we may call
PngPnLL∗ the value of non-tradable goods production which is “Rybczynski-attributable”
11to the stock of pre-existing foreign worker-residents; analogously for PtgPtLL∗ and trad-
able goods. Together, these terms represent the GDP-loss that the economy would suﬀer
from a loss of all non-native labor, if goods prices did not change. This leads to the
following intuitive interpretations of the augmentation in the immigration surplus of (16).
Proposition 2 (augmented immigration surplus) The complementarity-based immi-
gration surplus is reinforced (mitigated) by endogenous changes in goods prices, if these
are associated — via the Stolper-Samuelson-relationship — with changes in wage rates such
that the attendant change in non-native labor income is negative (positive). Equivalently,
the eﬀect is reinforced (mitigated) if goods price adjustments lower (increase) the value of
production which is “Rybczynski-attributable” to the stock of foreign worker-residents.
The proof directly follows from (16), recognizing that L∗gLPtϕt
LdL∗ = L∗gLPtdPt =
dPtgPtLL∗. Besides causing internal redistribution, the Stolper-Samuelson relationship
is thus also relevant for aggregate native welfare. Notice that such an eﬀect always arises
if there are non-tradable goods. For tradable goods, the corresponding eﬀect of course
vanishes if the country is small on world markets.
3 Migration and skills: a structural model
Because of its generality, the model used in the preceding section deﬁes sharp analyti-
cal results and is not directly amenable to empirical quantiﬁcation. Keeping the general
assumptions as above, this section implements our main arguments within a simple struc-
tural model of the speciﬁc-factors-variety. It allows for analytical solutions for goods price
changes and paves the way for a calibration-based numerical treatment in section 4.
Our model structure is inspired by several observations. In most OECD countries,
migrants are on average less skilled than natives, and the trend points towards a further
deterioration in the relative skill content of immigration. In addition to this skewedness,
the skill-distribution of immigration in some countries also exhibits bimodality at the
12high and low ends of the scale. This seems true particularly for the US.8 Analyzing such
bimodality calls for at least three skill levels. Thus, we break L into high-skilled labor (H),
labor with a medium level of skills (M), and unskilled labor (U), so that L = {H,M,U},





As regards production and trade, our model reﬂects specialization driven by product
diﬀerentiation and endowments- and technology-based comparative advantage. This im-
plies that, relative to a well diversiﬁed pattern of consumption, production is specialized
on a subset of goods, the demand of which is ﬁnitely elastic; see Marquez (2002). We
model this by assuming three goods, an export good X, an import good Z,a n dan o n -
tradable good N, and by assuming that residents consume all of these goods, whereas
p r o d u c t i o ni ss p e c i a l i z e di nt h ee x p o r t a b l ea n dt h en o n - t r a d a b l eg o o d .T ot h ee x t e n tt h a t
potential immigrants live in subsistence or are unemployed in their home countries, we
can safely ignore the implications of immigration for export demand or import supply.
In OECD countries, the non-tradable goods sector, particularly market-oriented activ-
ities (construction, services), is typically less skill-intensive than the exportables sector;
see e.g. Dimaranan and McDougall (2002). We model this by assuming that exportables
use high-skilled labor, alongside medium-skilled labor which is in turn also used in the non-
tradable sector, together with unskilled labor. Given labor endowment L = {H,M,U},
outputs in the X-a n dt h eN-sector are generated according to production functions
Qn = qn (U,Mn) and Qx = qx (H,M − Mx), which are linearly homogeneous and strictly
concave. This yields a speciﬁc-factors structure which has, with varying details, been used
extensively in the study of international migration; see Jones (1979), Srinivasan (1983),
and - more recently - Razin & Sadka (1997,2001), and Bilal et al. (2003).
We should like to point out that the model allows for alternative interpretations.
8See OECD (2001, table 5.8) for evidence based on educational categories, and Jasso et al. (2002) on
US bimodality. Bimodality is also observed for some EU countries; see Brücker et al. (2002, p. 24).
13First, the formal analysis does not hinge on our skill-intensity assumptions. Opposite
assumptions are easily implemented by relabelling sectors and/or labor-types. Secondly,
t h em o d e lm a ye v e nb ei n t e r p r e t e dw i t h o u ta n yr e f e r e n c et os k i l ll e v e l s .T h ef u n d a m e n t a l
assumption then is that immigrant labor is either speciﬁc to the tradable goods sector, or
speciﬁc to non-tradables goods, while there is a third class of labor which is entirely native
and perfectly mobile across both types of goods. Sector-speciﬁcity of migrant labor may
also be due to regulation pertaining to immigrant employment; see Engerman & Jones
(1997) and Müller (2003).
Preferences are represented, identically for natives and immigrants, by a strictly quasi-
concave utility function u(Dx,D n,D z),w h e r eDj indicates consumption of good j.W e
denote goods prices by Px, Pn,a n dPz. Choosing the imported good as our numéraire,
we set Pz =1 . The price vector for tradable goods thus appears as Pt = {Px,1}. Utility
maximization subject to an expenditure constraint, PDn + PxDx + Dm ≤ E,l e a d st o
Marshallian demand functions Dj = dj(Px,Pn,E), j = x,n,z. We add a foreign demand
function for good X, Dx∗ = dx∗(Px,Y∗), which we allow to be ﬁnitely elastic in Px.
Translating the true residence system (TRS) and the repatriated income system (RIS) of





WhH + WmM + WuU + ¯ R ¯ K, if TRS
Wh ¯ H + Wm ¯ M + Wu ¯ U + ¯ R ¯ K, if RIS
. (17)
3.1 Skill-speciﬁc wages and labor endowment
In equilibrium, proﬁt maximizing labor demands must equal domestic endowments, in-
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The ﬁrst equation in each line refers to high- and unskilled labor (speciﬁc factors), while
the second equation relates to mobile labor with medium skills, which features a common
wage rate Wm in both sectors. Moreover, the endowment constraint implies Mx = ¯ M −
14Mn,w h e r e b yM∗ =0captures bimodality of migration in skills. Linear homogeneity
of qx(·) and qn(·) implies the usual zero-proﬁt conditions: Px = cx(Wh,Wm) and Pn =
cn(Wu,Wm),w h e r ecx(·) and cn(·) are concave minimum unit-cost functions.
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n). (21)
Equations (18) through (21) constitute a system of 6 equations determining 6 endogenous
variables: Wh,Wm,Wu,Mn,Px, and Pn. Outputs are determined from equilibrium allo-
cation of mobile labor, according to the production functions qx(·) and qn(·). The adding
up condition implies dz(Px,Pn,E) ≡ E−Pxdx(Px,Pn,E)−Pn(Px,Pn,E). Hence, goods











+ ¯ RK∗, if RIS
. (22)
These expressions state that the value of merchandise exports, PxD∗x,e q u a l st h ev a l u e
of merchandise imports, Dz, plus the value of net imports of labor and capital services.
3.2 Immigration, equilibrium domestic wages and native welfare
We model immigration policy as changes in the domestic supply of high-skilled and un-
skilled labor, H and U. Assuming for simplicity that U∗ =0and H∗ =0initially,
and assuming stationary domestic labor, we have ˆ H = dH∗/H and ˆ U = dU∗/U.W i t h
ˆ M∗ =0 , bimodality of immigration arises if ˆ H>0 and ˆ U>0. As the augmented
immigration surplus is driven essentially by wage eﬀects, we focus on Wh,Wm and Wu,
carefully observing goods price endogeneity. The above system of equilibrium conditions
may be reduced by substituting out goods prices. Dividing the relevant factor market
equilibrium conditions in (18) and (19) leads to the familiar equality of relative wage
rates and the marginal rates of substitution in each of the two sectors. Inserting the zero
proﬁt conditions, Px = cx(Wh,Wm) and Pn = cn(Wu,Wm), into (20) and (21) then
15leaves 4 equilibrium conditions determining the three wage rates, as well as the allocation
of mobile labor Mn.
Equations (23) through (26) state these conditions in diﬀerentiated form, using the
familiar “hat-notation” to denote relative changes.
ˆ H + µ ˆ M
n = σ
x( ˆ W
m − ˆ W
h), (23)
ˆ U − ˆ M
n = σ
n( ˆ W




h +( 1− θ
x) ˆ W
m]+α ˆ E + ˆ ζ = θ





u +( 1− θ
n) ˆ W
m]+ ˆ E = θ
n ˆ U +( 1− θ
n) ˆ M
n. (26)
The ﬁrst two equations apply the deﬁnition of the elasticities of labor substitution in
the two sectors, σx > 0 and σn > 0, recognizing that full employment of M implies
Mx = −µ ˆ Mn,w h e r eµ = Mx/M n. Equations (25) and (26) capture commodity market
equilibrium, observing the zero proﬁt conditions in diﬀerentiated form: ˆ Px = θ
x ˆ Wh +
(1 − θ
x) ˆ Wm and θ
n ˆ Wu+(1− θ
n) ˆ Wm,w h e r eθ
x and θ
n are cost-shares of medium-skilled
labor. The equations assume Cobb-Douglas preferences, so that demand for the non-
tradable good features a unitary price elasticity: ηn =1 . This rules out cross-price-eﬀects
in demand, hence ˆ Dx = − ˆ Px + ˆ E. The elasticity of export demand with respect to Px
is denoted by η∗ > 0, whence ˆ Dx∗ = −η∗ ˆ Px + ˆ Y ∗. Overall demand for the exportable
good changes according to −[α +( 1− α)η∗] ˆ Px +α ˆ E +( 1− α) ˆ Y ∗. In (25), η is deﬁned
as [α +( 1− α)η∗].N o t e t h a t η →∞if η∗ →∞ . Assuming that immigrants do not
contribute to foreign supply or demand, we set ˆ Y ∗ =0 ; see above.
Equations (23) through (26) determine wage eﬀects ˆ Wl (l = h,m,u) and mobile labor
reallocation ˆ Mn from exogenous changes in labor endowments, ˆ U and ˆ H,a sw e l la sf r o m
the change in domestic expenditure ˆ E. The latter, however, is endogenous, and deter-
mined according to equation (17). This nexus of factor prices and income/expenditure
generates substantial complexity. We may, however, obtain signiﬁcant insights by de-
composing the solution. We deﬁne Ωnx as the elasticity of an endogenous variable n,
n =( Mn,Wh,Wm,Wu), with respect to an immigration-induced change in an exogenous
variable, x =( U,H), obtained by solving the subsystem (23) through (26) for constant
16domestic expenditure. Adding the inﬂuence of aggregate expenditure on labor allocation
Mn and factor prices, measured by corresponding elasticities ΩnE, and taking into ac-
count the eﬀect of immigration on domestic expenditure, measured by elasticities ΞEx,
we arrive at general equilibrium elasticities Γnx = Ωnx + ΩnEΞEx.N o t i c et h a td o m e s t i c
expenditure may be aﬀected directly through a change in the domestic work force, and
indirectly via immigration-induced factor price changes.
In this section, we focus on the elasticities Ωnx. We apply a graphical tool to char-
acterize the basic mechanisms behind Ωnx and discuss the above mentioned Borjas- and
Davis-Weinstein-models as special cases. The appendix derives the full solution according
to the aforementioned decomposition. Moreover, section 4 provides numerical analogues
of Γnx for discrete migration ﬂows, focusing among other things on the diﬀerence between
RIS and the TRS. Assuming expenditure constant is valid even in general equilibrium
terms in either of two situations. The ﬁrst is one where preferences are quasi-linear in the
imported good, in which case income changes are absorbed by changes in imports and all
income eﬀects disappear in the equilibrium conditions (20) and (21). If the import good
is a superior good, this might be a reasonable approximation. Alternatively, one may
refer to a case where the government holds (nominal) domestic expenditure constant by
means of a suitable macroeconomic policy. The current account would then, of course,
no longer be zero across scenarios, but instead adjust endogenously, depending on the
income change associated with a certain scenario.
In line with the augmented immigration surplus identiﬁed in equation (16), the sub-
sequent analysis relies on a representation of the above equilibrium system by means of
augmented factor price (or wage) frontiers, and augmented labor demand schedules.
Augmented wage frontiers: Traditional factor price frontiers depict alternative com-
binations of factor prices that are consistent with zero proﬁt conditions, given product
prices. Our augmented wage frontiers now incorporate the relevant goods market equilib-
rium, given sector-speciﬁc endowments. In the present case there are two such frontiers,
17relating to sectors X and N, with sector speciﬁc labor endowments H and U.U n l i k e
traditional frontiers, the augmented frontiers are not necessarily downward-sloping. For
instance, while a fall in Wm would facilitate an increase in Wh for a given Px,t h ea t -
tendant increase in Mx depresses the equilibrium goods price and, thus, the rental for
the speciﬁc factor H. Depending on the ease of factor substitution and the price elastic-
ity of demand, Wh may in fact fall. A complete analogy obtains for sector N.F o r m a l
expressions may be obtained by combining (23) and (25), which yields AWFx,a sw e l la s































The slopes ωx and ωn in (AWFx)a n d( A W F n)d e p e n do nt h es i g n so fη − σx and 1 −
σn, respectively, and the absolute value of these slopes is increasing in the respective
elasticities of substitution in labor use, and decreasing in the price-elasticities of demand.
The AWF-schedules capture two opposing forces determining the native welfare eﬀect
of immigration. One is the complementarity eﬀect w h i c hi sr e s p o n s i b l ef o rt h et r a d i t i o n a l
immigration surplus which decreases with σ. The other is the price-sensitivity of demand
which governs the goods price eﬀects of immigration. Speciﬁcally, a low value of η∗ in η ≡
α+(1 − α)η∗ is conducive to a deterioration of the terms-of-trade, which potentially oﬀsets
the complementarity eﬀect. If the country is small, then η →∞and the AWFx —locus
collapses to a standard factor price frontier, with its elasticity given by −θ
x/(1 − θ
x). On
the other hand, if σx →∞ ,t h e nωx is 1,a n di fσx → 0 it turns out to be −θ
x/(1 − θ
x).
Similar results obtain for σn. If the elasticity of substitution and the elasticity of demand
coincide, the AWF locus is a vertical line.
The variables E, ζ, H and U determine the position of the AWF schedules. Changes
in domestic or foreign expenditure lead to an upward-shift, if the respective elasticity of
substitution is smaller than the elasticity of demand. As more income is available, demand
18increases and goods prices are pushed up, which facilitates higher wage rates. Changes
in the supply of speciﬁcl a b o rH or U, due to immigration, have opposite, but otherwise
symmetric eﬀects. The smaller the diﬀerence between the elasticity of substitution and
the elasticity of supply, the larger the shift of the AWF-curves. If either is inﬁnity, the
curves do not shift at all.
Augmented M-labor demand schedules: The augmented demand schedules for mo-
bile labor describe labor demand as functions of Wm, again incorporating market clearing
on the respective goods markets. In inverse and diﬀerentiated form we have:
ˆ W
m =







x + σx (1 − θ
x)



















Like traditional labor demand schedules, the ALDs are downward-sloping. A high value
of σx implies easy substitution between medium- and high-skilled labor in X and, thus,
a large quantity reaction upon changes in Wm. In turn, a large value of η makes the
marginal value productivity of M-type labor less sensitive to changes in employment. All
of this results in a ﬂatter ALDx-curve. As η →∞ , the slope approaches −θ
x/σx,a n da s
η → 0, it approaches −∞, regardless of the value of σx. On the other hand, as σx →∞
the slope approaches −(1 − θ
x)/η,a n di fσx =0the slope converges to −∞.
Commodity market clearing may require counter-intuitive shifts upon changes in the
stock of the speciﬁc factor, the crucial factors again being η−σx and 1−σn. For instance,
as u ﬃciently low price-elasticity of demand coupled with a high elasticity of substitution,
η − σx < 0, implies that the marginal value productivity of Mx falls as H increases,
shifting ALDx down. Moreover, for a given sign of η − σx,a ni n c r e a s ei nt h es t o c ko f
the speciﬁc factor shifts the ALDx-curve by a larger amount, the higher the degree of
19complementarity and the smaller the demand elasticity.9
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium for a given level of domestic expenditure, combin-
ing the augmented AWF- and the ALD-lines. The center-panel contains an augmented,
Mussa-type “scissors diagram” which pins down the equilibrium allocation of mobile labor
M (see Mussa, 1974), while the augmented factor price frontiers relate the mobile factor’s
wage rate to the remuneration of speciﬁcf a c t o r sH and U in sector X and N, respectively.
Remember that along these schedules both goods markets are in equilibrium. Labor mar-
ket equilibrium is identiﬁed by the intersection of the augmented labor demand curves,
which determines the allocation Mn and the wage rate Wm of mobile labor. Equilibrium
wage rates for H and U are then found on the two augmented factor price frontiers.
Figure 1 shows how immigration of various types aﬀects the AWF− and the ALD−lines.
We use a subscript 0 to indicate the initial equilibrium, while subscripts 1 and 2 indicate
the new equilibrium under alternative parameter assumptions. First we look at a small
open economy, where all goods are tradables with inﬁnite price-elasticities. Immigration
then aﬀects domestic welfare through a pure complementarity eﬀect, corresponding to the
discrete analogue of the term L∗gLLdL∗ in equation (16). The ALD- and AWF-schedules
are downward-sloping, and immigration causes vertical shifts by (θ
x/σx) ˆ H and (θ
n/σn) ˆ U,
respectively, while leaving the wage frontiers unaﬀected. Note that a high degree of com-
plementarity (low values of σx and σn) generates a large ALD-shift.
For the sake of illustration, we focus on a case where ˆ H>0 and ˆ U = ˆ M =0 .
Immigration then initiates a reallocation of mobile labor into the X-sector, changing Mn
and driving up Wm, while pushing down wages for both speciﬁcf a c t o r s . T h u sh i g h -
skilled immigration harms unskilled workers, if mobile resources are drawn away from
the sector in which unskilled labor ﬁnds employment. The hatched area between the
9In a similar way, a change in domestic or foreign income shifts the ALD locus up. Via the zero proﬁt
condition, higher prices mandate higher wage rates. Note that this eﬀect is zero if η →∞ , whence higher
income is absorbed on the goods market without pressure on prices. To avoid unnecessary clutter, we set
ˆ ζ =0in the remainder of the analysis.
20ALDx
0− and the ALDx
1−lines, labeled (Y1 − Y0), measures the increase in GDP brought
about by such immigration. However, migrant labor H∗
1 as a claim on this according to
Wh
1 . With constant goods prices, native welfare changes in line with native income, as
deﬁned in equation (6). The complementarity-based immigration surplus corresponding
to proposition 1 is found as the change in native income Y N
1 − Y N
0 , which is equal to
the triangle ABC. This is recognized by identifying the income gain to M-type labor
as (Wm
1 − Wm
0 ) ¯ M, and realizing that this exceeds the loss to speciﬁcf a c t o r s ¯ H and ¯ U,





The remaining diﬀerence, i.e., the aforementioned triangle ABC, measures the Borjas-
type immigration surplus. Notice, however, that the immigration surplus vanishes if —
in addition to perfectly elastic demand — σn is inﬁnite. This follows from the previous
argument, recognizing from (ALDn) that the slope of the ALDn−locus converges to zero
as σn →∞ . We may extend these ﬁndings to more general immigration scenarios by
means of the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (generalized complementarity) Suppose the economy is small and
both goods produced, X and N, are tradables, and suppose there is immigration of (sector—
X-speciﬁc) high-skilled or (sector—N-speciﬁc) unskilled labor, or simultaneous immigration
of both types of labor. Then the following holds:
(i) Immigration of whatever pattern is devoid of any wage- or native welfare-eﬀect, if
either σx or σn is inﬁnite, and if both goods continue to be produced domestically.
(ii) It unambiguously beneﬁts mobile (medium-skilled) labor, while hurting both high-
skilled and unskilled labor, if σx and σn are ﬁnite.
(iii) If σx and σn are ﬁnite, it generates a positive native welfare eﬀect (Borjas).
The formal proof follows from the full solution of system (23) to (26) provided in the
appendix. Here we provide some intuition based on ﬁgure 1. Note that part (i) of the
proposition involves a case with an equal number of goods and factors, hence the zero proﬁt
conditions alone determine factor rewards, independently on endowments. Moreover, the
21direction of wage changes is determined by the factor intensity ranking, and does not
depend on the magnitudes of the elasticities, provided both are ﬁnite. The crucial point
in (i) is that a low elasticity of substitution within a sector receiving industry-speciﬁc
migration is not enough to establish a complementarity-based immigration surplus. If the
industry faces perfectly elastic domestic supply of medium-skilled labor which is mobile
internally, then the immigration surplus vanishes as well. More generally, reallocation of
the mobile factor erodes complementarity in general equilibrium and alleviates the wage
pressure in the receiving sector, but only to have it re-appear in the other sector which does
not receive any immigration. Of course, this type of adjustment mechanism disappears,
if there is a symmetric inﬂow of both H and U-type labor (bimodal immigration). It is
apparent from ﬁgure 1 that the parameter ratios θ
x/σx and θ
n/σn determine the optimal
composition of a given size of labor inﬂow. We shall return to this in the quantitative
exercise of section 4.
Next, we turn to the case of a ﬁnite price-elasticity of export demand, giving rise to
what was called augmented complementarity in (16) above. Now we must distinguish be-
tween the native income eﬀect, and the native welfare eﬀect of immigration. A lower price
of the export good always hurts native income, but lower prices are good for consumers,
and the net eﬀect on welfare is given by the ﬁnal term of equation (16). For a “small
change” the net eﬀect for the non-tradable good is always zero, but for “large changes”
analogous reasoning applies for non-tradables. In terms of ﬁgure 1, the impact of high-
skilled immigration can be understood as arising in two steps: First the ALDx−curve
shifts up by the complementarity eﬀect, then it is forced down again by a reduction in
Px. This latter eﬀect leads to Ricardo-Viner-type redistribution: Wm falls, but less than
proportionally with Px,a n dWh falls more than proportionally with Px. A worsened
terms-of-trade is shouldered by three factors, viz. domestic and foreign high-skilled labor,
and domestic medium-skilled labor. Unskilled natives, on the other hand, are now better
oﬀ, relative to the previous (small-country) case, since the price eﬀect as such triggers
reallocation of mobile labor into the non-tradables sector. However, as long as η−σx > 0
22the complementarity eﬀect still dominates the terms-of-trade eﬀect, and the distributional
consequences identiﬁed in proposition 3 above obtain. Moreover, high-skilled immigration
now also aﬀects the AWFx-line, causing a leftward shift to AWFx
1; see equation (AWFx)
above.
Clearly, the condition η−σx =0marks a dividing line. This is brought to the fore by
the following proposition which still relates to to a pure tradable goods case.
Proposition 4 (augmented complementarity - tradables only) Suppose that both
X and N are tradables, and both goods are produced domestically. If X is an export good,
with η ﬁnite, and N is an imported good with a given world price, then the following holds:
(i) If η −σx > 0, then the distributional consequences of immigration of whatever pattern
are as in proposition 3 (ii) above.
(ii) If η − σx < 0 and σn is ﬁnite, and if X is a pure export good, then immigration of
(sector—X-speciﬁc) high-skilled labor leads to a negative welfare eﬀect (Davis-Weinstein).
The immigration loss is accompanied by a reverse internal reallocation of mobile labor
into the N-sector, and the loss is more than fully accommodated by a real income loss to
H-tye labor and mobile M-type labor, with a real income gain for unskilled labor.
The intuition is easily grasped using ﬁgure 1. As above, a given world price of N is
equivalent to assuming ηn →∞ . Part (i) of the proposition then immediately follows from
the reasoning of the previous paragraph, with wage rates for high-skilled and unskilled
labor, respectively, falling to Wh
1 and Wu
1 . Notice, however, that (i) does not include any
statement about welfare. Even if the complementarity eﬀect dominates in that η−σx > 0,
native income may fall, since the terms-of-trade deterioration has a direct negative eﬀect
on native H-type labor income, which is no longer measured underneath the initial ALDx
0-
line. Thus, if ALDx
1 depicts post-migration augmented labor demand, then the triangle
ABC does not depict the change in native income, Y N
1 −Y N
0 . The potential for a negative
native income eﬀect, even for η − σx > 0, is best understood from the proof for part (ii).
Statement (ii) does include a welfare eﬀect for the special case where X is a pure
23export good. This implies Dx =0and η = η∗. Any native income gain then is equivalent
to a welfare gain, and vice versa. Now, let η − σx converge to zero. In the limit, there
is no vertical shift in the ALDx−schedule. The output eﬀect of an increase in H is
completely oﬀset by a deterioration of the terms-of-trade. There is no reallocation of
mobile labor, and GDP before and after immigration are the same, which implies that
t h e r ei sal o s si nG D Pper capita. Moreover, as immigrant wages are paid out of an
unchanged GDP, immigration reduces native income. A fortiori, native income is reduced
if η − σx < 0,i nw h i c hc a s eA L D x shifts down below its initial position, labeled ALFx
2 in
ﬁgure 1. With ηn →∞and Dx =0 , domestic consumer prices remain constant, and lower
native income implies an immigration loss. Moreover, since both AWFn and ALDx are
downward-sloping, the reallocation and redistribution eﬀects of proposition 4 are readily
established. It should be noted that η − σx < 0 implies an upward-sloping initial g AWF
x
0-
l i n e ,w h i c hi nt u r ns h i f t st ot h eleft towards AWFx
2 upon immigration-induced ˆ H; see
equation (AWFx) above. Part (ii) of proposition 4 is in some sense equivalent to the
case analyzed by Ethier (1985), who considers single-sector, pure export production, but
assumes imperfect substitution between domestic and foreign labor, rather than between
skill classes. Perhaps more importantly, however, part (ii) of the proposition establishes
the Davis-Weinstein-type negative result that we have juxtaposed with the notion of a
Borjas-type immigration surplus in the introduction.
Next, we turn to the core interpretation of our model, where N is a non-tradable good,
with a unitary price elasticity of demand. There is now also a borderline given by σn =1 .
It is straightforward that part (i) of proposition 4 is upheld if σn < 1.B u tt h ep r i c ee ﬀect
for the non-tradable complicates the welfare analysis. For instance, in the case considered
by (ii) of proposition 4, output of the non-tradable good increases and equilibrium requires
af a l li nPn. While this is fully incorporated in the AWFn-a n dA L D n-lines, it negates
a welfare conclusion from the native income change. However, referring to equation (16)
above, we may state the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (augmented complementarity with non-tradables) Suppose that the
24domestic economy produces a pure exportable good X,w i t hη ﬁn i t e ,a n dan o n - t r a d a b l e
good N. Suppose, moreover, that a certain stock of foreign unskilled labor is already
present, U∗ > 0,w h i l eH∗ =0initially. Then, marginal immigration of (X-speciﬁc)
high-skilled labor entails a native welfare loss, if η − σx < 0 and σn is ﬁnite.
This follows from the previous proposition and equation (16) of the previous section, which
s h o w st h a ta tt h em a r g i nt h e r ei sn od i r e c tw e l f a r ee ﬀect from any change in Pn, while the
terms-of-trade deterioration constitutes a ﬁrst-order welfare loss. Notice, however, that
for a discrete inﬂow of high-skilled labor the ensuing fall in the price of the non-tradable
good becomes welfare-relevant. The proposition highlights a further case which may be
subsumed under the Davis-Weinstein-result mentioned in the introduction.
If σn > 1 and η−σx < 0,t h e r ei scomplete dominance of price eﬀects.T h eA F W n-line
is upward-sloping, and ˆ U>0 shifts the ALDn-line down.A n y i n ﬂow of whatever skill
pattern causes a fall in all nominal wage rates. This seems like an extreme variant of
the Davis-Weinstein-case, but looking at nominal wages alone is not enough for welfare
conclusions. Changes in real wages are found by setting the full solutions for ˆ Wh, ˆ Wm
and ˆ Wu against price changes according to β
x ˆ Px + β
n ˆ Pn = β
x[θ





n) ˆ Wu],w h e r eβ
x and β
n are the expenditure shares on the export and the
n o n - t r a d a b l eg o o d ;s e et h ea p p e n d i x .T h el a r g e rt h es h a r eo fe x p o r ts a l e si nX-output,
1−α, and the larger at the same time the shares of good X and N in domestic expenditure,
β
x + β
n, the larger the real wage eﬀects for any type of labor. Moreover, the price cut
for the non-tradable good, and thus the real wage eﬀect, is larger under the repatriated
income system (RIS) than under the true residence system (TRS). Immigration under the
RIS, particularly unskilled immigration, boosts supply of the non-tradable good, while
immigrant labor income does not contribute to domestic demand. Under the TRS, all
immigrant labor income is spent domestically according to uniform preferences, hence
there is a direct expansionary demand eﬀect from immigration which clearly mitigates
the downward pressure on Pn; see (17) above. The quantitative importance of such price
changes for the native welfare eﬀects of immigration will become apparent in the next
25section which turns to a numerical perspective.
4 A numerical perspective
The previous sections have provided a theoretical treatment of some hitherto neglected
channels through which immigration aﬀects native welfare. But do they make a diﬀerence
quantitatively? What are the structural characteristics of an immigration country that
make them particularly important? And whata r et h eo r d e r so fm a g n i t u d et h a tw ea r e
talking about? In this section, we pursue a calibration-based numerical analysis which
provides tentative answers to these questions. A numerical approach also allows us to
extend the substantive focus of our analysis beyond the conﬁnes of analytical tractability.
Speciﬁcally, it facilitates capturing the interdependence between factor prices and aggre-
gate income/expenditure and, thus, to highlight the diﬀerence between the two systems of
repatriated income (RIS) and true residence (TRS); see the appendix for a full solution.
Turning to a numerical treatment also allows to look at discrete migration ﬂows, in
addition to the local results derived above. This seems particularly important, given the
above mentioned potential for non-monotonicity of the welfare eﬀect. Moreover, we shall
be able to more systematically explore the implications of varying skill-compositions of
immigration, such as the bimodal immigration mentioned in the introduction.
A ﬁnal motivation for the quantitative analysis pursued in this section derives from
the signiﬁcance of capital. Based on a principal insight from section 2, we were able to
derive important qualitative insights without explicitly modeling capital in production.
The crucial assumption was that all capital stocks are endogenously adjusted under condi-
tions of perfect international capital mobility. However, this view of capital has important
quantitative implications. More speciﬁcally, the Le Chatelier-Samuelson principle identi-
ﬁed in section 2 implies that the wage and associated welfare eﬀects of immigration are
dampened, relative to a case where capital stocks are given from domestic endowments.
On the other hand, the presence of capital generates additional leverage for welfare ef-
26fects of immigration through endogenous goods price changes. If native capital income is
determined by a ﬁxed capital rental ¯ R from world capital markets and by given domestic
capital ownership ¯ K, any reduction in the domestic non-tradable goods price brought
about by immigration implies a gain in real terms for a substantial fraction of native
income.
4.1 The calibration approach
The aim of this section is to put likely orders of magnitude on the wage and welfare
eﬀects of alternative conceivable migration scenarios, relying on an empirically relevant
parameterization of our model. Even though we do not go as far as analyzing speciﬁc
proposals for immigration policy, this seems an important ﬁrst step towards quantiﬁcation.
We parameterize our model by combining extraneous information on elasticity values,
as well as direct observations of key empirical magnitudes, in order determine remaining
model parameters from equilibrium conditions, such that the model replicates a realistic
data set as a benchmark equilibrium solution. More speciﬁcally, we specify η∗ from recent
econometric evidence on trade elasticities. For domestic demand we assume Cobb-Douglas
preferences, determining budget shares for tradables and non-tradables from observations
for a typical OECD (immigration-) country. We use a nested CES-parameterization for
technology, relying on recent econometric evidence for elasticities of substitution between
capital and labor, as well as between diﬀerent types of labor. Again, production and cost-
shares are determined from stylized observations for a typical OECD country. As regards
initial endowments, we rely on observed labor force skill-distributions. And ﬁnally, in
order to calibrate benchmark equilibrium wage rates, we utilize observations on functional
as well as personal income distribution. The appendix describes further details, including
sources, and presents the full benchmark data set in table A.2.
274.2 Simulation results
Given the above discussion, and given the skill-orientation of the immigration policy de-
bate, the scenario design should be organized around the skill-composition of immigration.
We therefore consider (1) a perfectly balanced inﬂow, where the immigrant and native la-
bor force share the same skill-composition so that immigration leaves the relative supply
of diﬀerent skill groups in the host economy unchanged, (2) a simultaneous immigration
of high- and unskilled workers (“inﬂow at tails”),w h e r e b y8 0 %o ft h ei n ﬂow are unskilled
workers and 20% is skilled labor, (3) an inﬂow of high-skilled workers only,a n d( 4 )a n
inﬂow only of unskilled workers. To ensure comparability with the results obtained by
Borjas (1995,1999) and Davis & Weinstein (2002), our base-case simulation assumes, for
each scenario, that d(H∗ + M∗ + U∗)/( ¯ H + ¯ M + ¯ U)=0 .12,w h e r eH∗ = M∗ = U∗ =0
initially. Scenario (2) is perhaps the most realistic one, as it features bimodality as well
as dominance of unskilled immigrants in OECD countries. Note that in the context of
the TRS regime scenario (1) is similar to Davis & Weinstein (D&W) in that it precludes
complementarity eﬀects between diﬀerent types of labor. It is, however, diﬀerent from
D&W in that there are non-tradable goods.
Table 1 reports on the base-case for each scenario, panel a) assuming a TRS and panel
b) assuming a RIS. Figures 2 through 5 illustrate how the welfare eﬀect varies with the
size of the inﬂow, comparing — separately for the TRS and the RIS — the base-case where
η∗ =2with the small country case where η∗ = ∞. The central magnitude reported is
the welfare eﬀect, measured by the equivalent variation. This is the additional income
that would be necessary — at initial prices — for natives to achieve their post-immigration
level of welfare. It can be written as EV = e(Pn
0 ,Px
0 ,1) · [Y n
1 /e(Pn
1 ,Px
1 ,1)] − Y n
0 ,w h e r e
subscripts 0 and 1 indicate pre- and post-immigration values. Native income Y n is as


















28Finally, we also report the Gini coeﬃcient, and the general equilibrium labor demand
elasticities generated by our model, including cross-price elasticities. We organize the
discussion of our ﬁndings around three core results.
Result 1: An unbalanced ﬂow of immigrants generates a sizeable welfare gain that may
compensate the D&W-type terms-of-trade eﬀect. Moreover, the welfare eﬀect is non-
monotonic in the size of the inﬂow.
D&W ﬁnd that an immigration-induced increase in overall endowment of about 12% re-
sults in a 0.8% loss in native real income, due to a terms-of-trade deterioration. Column
(1) of table 1 covers the corresponding case of proportional immigration where the com-
plementarity term −L∗gLLdL∗ in equation (16) is zero. In contrast to D&W, a lower
export price is coupled with a falling price of non-tradables which increases the real value
of interest earnings, whence the welfare loss falls to 0.55%. The loss is further reduced
if immigration is bimodal, with a bias towards unskilled workers (column 2). Exports
expand at a lower rate, with a more modest terms-of-trade deterioration. Combined with
ab e n e ﬁcial complementarity eﬀect, this brings the welfare loss down to a mere 0.15%.
If all immigrant labor is unskilled, then the welfare eﬀect turns positive, with a sizable
gain of 0.82%. This is in stark contrast to D&W who argue (section V.B) that labor
heterogeneity leaves the welfare results quantitatively and qualitatively unchanged.
We have argued in section 2 that the ﬁrst-order terms-of-trade eﬀect of immigration,
coupled with a second-order complementarity eﬀect, may cause the welfare eﬀect to be
non-monotonic. Figure 2 provides evidence for this phenomenon. For high-skilled immi-
gration, the welfare eﬀect reaches a minimum of about -3.15% of GDP at an inﬂow of
24%, and then improves again for higher levels of immigration. While this trough does
not lie within the reach of realistic immigration ﬂows, the bimodal scenario features a
much lower point of turnaround, at an inﬂow of about 12%, which is roughly equal to the
D&W-magnitude. Thus, the welfare loss of -0.15% exhibited in table 1 really is the worst
possible case. This ﬁnding has important normative implications. While the D&W result
29might suggest a more restrictive policy stance, our framework suggests that a reduction
in the loss could also be obtained with an opposite policy, viz. an increase in immigration.
Obviously, the empirical strategy behind these results is too rough for sweeping policy
conclusions. But the principal possibility of such non-monotonicities should be recognized
when formulating theory-based advice for migration policy.
Result 2: In contrast to Borjas’ results, under the RIS with η∗ = ∞,a nu n b a l a n c e d
inﬂow need not be beneﬁcial for natives, while a perfectly balanced inﬂow always is. More-
over, immigration tends to yield a higher welfare gain under the RIS than under the TRS.
Setting η∗ = ∞ makes our framework comparable to Borjas (1995,1999) and Bauer &
Zimmermann (1997), who consistently predict a non-negative welfare eﬀect. In our setup,
a welfare loss may arise even if η∗ = ∞.T h i si se x p l a i n e db yt h eﬁrst term of equation
(16). Due to non-tradables, this augmented term can be negative, even if conventional
complementarity holds (gLLdL∗ < 0).A n y i n ﬂow which leads to an excess demand for
non-tradables drives up Pn, with two consequences. First, since native capital income
is tied down in nominal terms by international capital mobility, it falls in real terms. If
this is an important enough part of native income, the associated real income loss may
even dominate the picture. A second eﬀect arises through the Stolper-Samuelson-term in
equation (16), which is interpreted in proposition 2. Taken together, these two eﬀects may
dominate the standard technology-based complementarity, as evidenced by ﬁgure 4 for the
case for high-skilled immigration under the TRS. Again, there is non-monotonicity, this
time with a much more realistic point of turnaround. However, if high-skilled immigrants
repatriate their income, as in ﬁgure 5, demand for non-tradables is driven by native income
alone, with a much lower increase in Pn.
With η∗ →∞ , a balanced inﬂow is devoid of native welfare gains under a TRS, as
in ﬁgure 2. Again, with non-tradable goods income repatriation makes a big diﬀerence.
Thus, ﬁgure 5 reveals that a 12% balanced inﬂow yields a 2% gain. If surprising at ﬁrst
sight, this result is easily understood. A positive welfare eﬀect is possible only if real wages
change. Under the TRS, a balanced inﬂow leads to a proportional expansion of production
30and demand, so that marginal productivities and prices remain constant. Therefore, real
wages cannot change. Under a RIS, proportional expansion of all outputs occurs with
unaltered domestic demand. Excess supply of domestic goods requires an adjustment
in relative prices. While marginal productivities remain constant, the change in relative
prices leads to changes in real wages, thus facilitating a welfare increase. We may call this
a demand-based complementarity eﬀect, as opposed to the technological complementarity
eﬀect, captured by gLLdL∗ < 0 in equation (16).
Looking at ﬁgure 4, one is tempted to conclude a clear ranking of scenarios: The more
immigration is dominated by unskilled labor, the larger the native welfare gain, at least
for realistic magnitudes of the inﬂow. This is in contrast to Borjas (1995, 1999), and
it works mainly through the price of non-tradable goods, as we have just pointed out.
For instance, a 12% “inﬂow at tails” which, by deﬁnition, is biased towards unskilled
labor, leads 0.15% gain. Note that this is considerably lower than the measure obtained
by Borjas (1995) in an otherwise comparable setting. Hence, the additional adjustment
mechanisms that we incorporate in our two-sector model (labor re-allocation, endogenous
goods prices) do make a diﬀerence in terms of empirical magnitudes.
Result 3: The welfare ranking of diﬀerent scenarios crucially depends on the repatria-
tion assumption, and on the size of the inﬂow.
Comparing ﬁgures 2 and 3 for the case where η∗ =2 ,a sw e l la s4a n d5f o rη∗ = ∞,
shows that the welfare ranking of scenarios is changed dramatically when we switch from
a true residence system (TRS) to a repatriated income system (RIS). Under the TRS,
unskilled immigration is most beneﬁcial because it allows a reduction in the overall price
level which augments the pure technical complementarity eﬀect. Moreover, high-skilled
immigration tends to be worst (at least for small to medium-size inﬂo w s ) ,a st h i ss t r o n g l y
deteriorates the economy’s terms-of-trade. Under the RIS, however, balanced immigration
dominates all other scenarios. For a given size of the inﬂow, output expansion is largest
if immigration is balanced, and large changes in relative prices may generate substantial
31welfare gains. Our ﬁgures illustrate that the scenario ranking also depends on the size of
the inﬂow. Consider, for instance the RIS with η∗ =2 : For small and medium-size inﬂows
unskilled immigration dominates, but for larger inﬂows perfectly balanced immigration
proves better.
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
We would expect that our simulation results are sensitive with respect to certain parameter
variations. A prime candidate is the price elasticity of export demand, where our base-
case in table 1 assumes η∗ =2 . T h i si sa nu n w e i g h t e da v e r a g et a k e nf r o mas u r v e yb y
Marquez (2002), who ﬁnds an interval for long-run econometric estimates ranging from
1t o3 . 10 It is interesting to note that there is very little correlation between country
size and the estimated elasticity, with estimates far away from η∗ →∞even for small
countries. Another important magnitude where countries might diﬀer from our base-case
is the degree of openness. Our base-case features a ratio of exports plus imports to GDP
which is equal to 0.5. From the Penn World Tables 6.0, we observe a lower end of 20
percent for Japan and 26 percent for the US, while the corresponding ﬁgure for large
European countries (say Germany, France or the UK) is around 60 percent, and small
countries (like Austria, Belgium or the Netherlands) exhibit openness beyond 100 percent.
How do our welfare results respond to re-calibrations of our model that reﬂect such
inter-country variation in trade elasticities and openness? Tables 2 and 3 provide some
sensitivity evidence for the “inﬂow at tails” scenario. While table 2 looks at independent
variations of each parameter for alternative sizes of the inﬂow, table 3 allows for simulta-
neous variations in both, the trade elasticity and openness. As expected, a larger value of
η∗ reduces the welfare loss (increases the gain) for all sizes of the inﬂow considered, and
for both the RIS and TRS. It also mitigates the non-monotonicity, as evidenced by line
10Using direct estimates of this elasticity is a notable diﬀerence between our empirical strategy and
Davis & Weinstein (2002) who use estimates of GDP-responsiveness to terms-of-trade changes in order
to infer a value for the trade elasticity.
323 of table 2. A similar pattern emerges if we reduce the degree of openness. Notice that
smaller openness implies a larger non-tradables sector. The sensitivity analysis thus rein-
forces the general case made above that non-tradables open up an important channel for
native welfare gains from an immigration scenario, if this is biased towards non-tradable
goods, as with the “inﬂow at tails” which is dominated by unskilled labor. The sensitivity
is more pronounced for a system where income is repatriated, since this features a more
pronounced price-reaction for non-tradable goods, as argued above.
Table 3 further testiﬁes to the importance of openness. For instance, increasing the
export price elasticity to η∗ =3improves the welfare eﬀect vis a vis the base-case, but if
this higher value applies to a more open economy, with 1−β
n increasing to 0.6, the welfare
gain is reduced below the base-case. Conversely, if η∗ is reduced to 1, the scenario is less
favorable to natives, but if the economy also becomes less open, then this deterioration
is mitigated, particularly for the RIS, although the loss still prevails. Under the RIS, a
sizable gain emerges for countries that are at the same time less open and facing a higher
trade elasticity. A notable feature of table 3 is that the sensitivity with respect to both,
the trade elasticity and the degree of openness, is much more pronounced if income is
r e p a t r i a t e dt h a ni fm i g r a n t sb e c o m et r u er e s i d e n t s .
5 Conclusions
International labor movements are among the most important long-term challenges for
economic policy in all countries that feature relatively high standards of living. Immi-
gration policies pursued in such countries are likely to remain restrictive and selective,
reﬂecting a policy debate which revolves around alleged positive and negative eﬀects of
immigration on the native work force, and on the general level of host-country welfare.
This paper consolidates two opposing views on how natives are aﬀected by immi-
gration, one emphasizing the immigration surplus coupled with wage eﬀects (Borjas,
1995,1999), the other identifying an aggregate native welfare loss due to terms-of-trade
33eﬀects (Davis & Weinstein, 2002). We ﬁrst develop a very general model allowing for an
arbitrary number of factors and goods, in order to derive conditions for a native welfare
gain from immigration. Our model combines quantitative restrictions on the stock of
foreign worker-residents with endogenous physical capital stocks, assuming perfect inter-
national capital mobility, and it allows for tradable as well as non-tradable goods. The
analysis augments the complementarity-based immigration surplus by incorporating en-
dogenous adjustment of goods prices. We derive a simple equation which breaks the total
change in native welfare into three parts: the traditional complementarity eﬀect stressed
by Borjas, a Stolper-Samuelson-type eﬀect operating through goods price endogeneity,
and the terms-of-trade eﬀect highlighted by Davis & Weinstein. While the ﬁrst two chan-
nels are of second-order, the latter is a ﬁrst-order eﬀect, so that its detrimental impact
on welfare dominates if the immigrant inﬂow is small.
We then derive additional insights and sharper results by translating our main argu-
ment into a more speciﬁc model structure featuring three skill-levels of labor. Introducing
wage frontiers and labor demand functions that are augmented to incorporate repercus-
sions from endogenous prices for exportable and non-tradable goods, we derive a num-
ber of propositions on the wage and welfare eﬀects of alternative immigration scenarios.
In various ways, these propositions set the complementarity-based immigration surplus
against the exportable and non-tradable goods price eﬀect within a unifying framework.
The contradictory welfare eﬀects reported in the aforementioned literature now emerge as
special cases. Relative to the existing literature, our approach highlights the importance
of adjustment mechanisms operating through reallocation of mobile (medium-skilled) la-
bor, and through immigration-induced capital inﬂows. These adjustment mechanisms
tend to reduce the size of the immigration surplus. At the same time, the price eﬀect
for non-tradable goods tends to increase native welfare gains, in particular if the inﬂow is
biased towards the non-tradables sector.
A calibration-based simulation exercise reveals that these additional channels prove
quantitatively important for realistic parameterizations of the model. It also reveals that,
34due to a coexistence of ﬁrst-order and second-order eﬀects, the native welfare eﬀect is
non-monotonic in the size of the labor inﬂow. Pursuing a numerical approach also allows
us to shed light on the diﬀerence between a system where immigrant income is repatriated,
and a system of true residence where all immigrant income is spent domestically. Due
mainly to the existence of a non-tradable goods sector, the two systems generate vastly
diﬀe r e n tn a t i v ew e l f a r ee ﬀects from immigration. For a large class of scenarios considered,
repatriation of immigrant income works to the advantage of natives.
Our sensitivity analysis reveals that seemingly small variations in the price elastic-
ity of export demand and the degree of openness on goods markets have considerable
consequences for how immigration aﬀects the host country, sometimes even changing
t h en a t i v ew e l f a r ee ﬀect in sign. The magnitude, and even the sign of the native wel-
fare eﬀect are quite sensitive with respect to these key parameters. While this might
be interpreted as a lack of robust results, we view it as a promising way to understand
why the attitudes towards immigration revealed by opinion polls, as well as actual im-
migration policies and econometric results vary over diﬀerent countries. Countries with
a lower degree of openness and a larger price elasticity of export demand appear better
positioned to reap welfare gains from immigration, particularly of immigrant income is re-
mitted. Unfavorable terms-of-trade eﬀects may easily be compensated by an augmented
complementarity-based surplus and by a favorable price eﬀect for non-tradable goods.
But, due to non-monotonicity, this may need a large size of the labor inﬂow.
A natural next step on the research agenda is to calibrate our model so as to capture
t h eo b s e r v e dv a r i a t i o ni nt h ed e g r e eo fo p e n n e s sa n dt h ep r i c ee l a s t i c i t yo fd e m a n d ,a s
well as the skill-distribution of inﬂows, in a detailed cross-country study. Comparing the
simulated wage and native welfare eﬀects might then help to explain the cross-country
diﬀerence in opinion polls and policies pursued. Research in this direction, combined with
a richer framework concerning labor market imperfections should also play an important
role for a more explicit normative underpinning of immigration policies.
35Table 1: Simulated labor market and welfare eﬀects of immigration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
perfectly inﬂow high-skilled unskilled
balanced at tails only only
Change in labor supply (%) ˆ H 12.0000 8.0000 40.0000 0.0000
ˆ M 12.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
ˆ U 12.0000 32.0000 0.0000 40.0000
Shares in total labor H/L 30.0000 28.9286 28.9286 28.9286
supply (%) (a) M/L 40.0000 35.7143 35.7143 35.7143
U/L 30.0000 35.3571 35.3571 35.3571
Case a): True residence system (TRS)
Labor reallocation (%) ˆ Mx 11.6192 -0.4930 -7.1631 1.1469
Change in real wages (b) ˆ Wm − ˆ P -1.2768 4.2752 12.1556 2.2789
ˆ Wh − ˆ P -1.4661 -1.5296 -19.1936 3.2987
ˆ Wu − ˆ P -1.2590 -16.9725 12.6766 -21.9203
Change in outputs (%) ˆ Qx 11.8595 6.3838 36.2743 -0.0283
ˆ Qn 11.8998 5.7208 0.3592 6.7124
Change in price level (%) (b) ˆ P -3.9494 -1.8000 3.9538 -3.0002
Rel. price (benchm.: 1.4281) Px/Pn 1.4282 1.4188 1.0515 1.5238
Change in welfare (%) EV/Y n
0 -0.5485 -0.1460 -2.6585 0.8170
Gini index (bench.: 0.2600) 0.2600 0.2972 0.2198 0.3142
Labor demand elasticities own -0.4798 -0.5480
medium 0.3039 0.0570
opposite 0.3169 0.0825
Case b): Repatriated income system (RIS)
Labor reallocation (%) ˆ Mx 41,5944 12,7626 31,0348 7,7965
Change in real wages (b) ˆ Wm − ˆ P -11,6549 -1,7494 -4,3289 -0,8078
ˆ Wh − ˆ P 6,6559 2,5450 -9,1912 5,4166
ˆ Wu − ˆ P -13,1887 -22,4466 -6,2771 -24,6067
Change in outputs ˆ Qx 13,6539 7,2655 39,2515 -0,4033
ˆ Qn 9,9217 4,8100 -2,1619 6,2591
Change in price level (%) (b) ˆ P -18.3662 -10.1160 -17.2717 -7.3702
Rel. price (benchm.: 1.4281) Px/Pn 1.7116 1.5605 1.3682 1.5994
Change in welfare (%) EV/Y n
0 0.5936 0.1950 -2.6723 1.0188
Gini index (benchm.: 0.2600) 0.3003 0.3175 0.2366 0.3345
Labor demand elasticities own -0.2298 -0.6152
medium -0.1082 -0.0202
opposite -0.1569 0.1354
Legend: For easy comparison, we specify all scenarios such that the overal size of the
inﬂow is 12% of the original native labor force. The underlying elasticity of export demand
is η∗ =2 , and the benchmark degree of openness is 0.5. See the main text and table A.2
for more details on the calibration procedure. (a): L = H + M + U.( b ) :P denotes the
unit-level of the expenditure function.
36Table 2: Sensitivity analysis for “inﬂow at tails”
Equivalent variation (in %)
Size of inﬂow (%)
6% 12% 18% 24%
TRS RIS TRS RIS TRS RIS TRS RIS
Openness: 1 − βn =0 .5
Export elasticity: η∗ =1 -0.36 -0.74 -0.61 -1.11 -0.80 -1.27 -0.94 -1.30
η∗ =2 -0.12 0.01 -0.15 0.19 -0.13 0.46 -0.08 0.79
η∗ =3 -0.05 0.21 -0.03 0.55 0.01 0.94 0.10 1.36
Export elasticity: η∗ =2
Openness: 1 − βn =0 .6 -0.15 -0.18 -0.27 -0.22 -0.32 -0.17 -0.35 -0.07
1 − βn =0 .5 -0.10 0.01 -0.15 0.19 -0.14 0.46 -0.08 0.79
1 − βn =0 .4 -0.06 0.22 -0.03 0.65 0.06 1.17 0.20 1.75
Legend:“ i n ﬂow at tails": 80% unskilled and 20% skilled labor; size of total inﬂow
measured in % of native labor force. TRS: true residence system. RIS: repatriated
income system. Boldfaced entries indicate base-case results. βn is the share of
expenditure (and production) that falls on non-tradable goods. Assuming that half
of the expenditure on tradables is spent on imports and imposing balanced trade,
the degree of openness, which is deﬁned as total trade over GDP, corresponds to
1 − βn.
Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis for “inﬂow at tails”
Equivalent variation (in %)
Openness: 1 − βn
0.6 0.5 0.4
TRS RIS TRS RIS TRS RIS
Export elasticity: η∗ =1 -1.01 -1.87 -0.61 -1.11 -0.56 -0.68
η∗ =2 -0.27 -0.22 -0.15 0.19 -0.03 0.65
η∗ =3 -0.23 0.07 -0.03 0.55 -0.05 0.88
Legend: Simulations for base-case size of the inﬂow: 12% of total na-
tive labor force. TRS: true residence system. RIS: repatriated income

















































Figure 1: The wage and welfare effects of immigration. Figure 2: Welfare eﬀects of diﬀerent scenarios (TRS, ηx =2 )
Figure 3: Welfare eﬀects of diﬀerent scenarios (RIS, ηx =2 )
39Figure 4: Welfare eﬀects of diﬀerent scenarios (TRS, ηx = ∞)
Figure 5: Welfare eﬀects of diﬀerent scenarios (RIS, ηx = ∞)
40Appendix: Full solution — endogenous expenditure
It proves convenient both for derivation and interpretation to decompose the general
equilibrium elasticities according to
Γnx = Ωnx + ΩnEΞEx, (28)
where n indicates an endogenous variable, with n = Mn,Wh,Wm,Wu,a n dx indicates
an exogenous variable, whereby we focus on immigration of high- and unskilled labor
only, i.e., x = H,U. The elasticities Ωnx emerge from solving the subsystem (23) through
(26). They are the ones that we focuse on in the analysis of section 3 in the text. In this
a p p e n d i x ,w ed e r i v et h et e r m sΩnEΞEx which capture the added interdependence arising
from endogenous expenditure. ΩnE measures the dependence of factor prices on aggregate
expenditure, derived by complete analogy to Ωnx from (23) — (26). ΞEx measures the eﬀect
of exogenous endowment changes on aggregate expenditure. Under TRS, this combines
t h ed i r e c te ﬀect from an immigration-induced increase in the work force, and the indirect
eﬀect of an immigration-induced change in domestic factor prices. Under RIS, domestic
expenditure is aﬀected via factor price changes alone; see equation (17). Since domestic
expenditure, in turn, aﬀects factor prices this generates a complex interdependence.
In matrix form, we may write the full system as
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, (29)
where [Ωnx] (4×2) and [ΩnE] (4×1) are elasticities emerging from the solution of (23)
through (26), and [ΦEn] (1×4) and [ΦEx] (1×2) are elasticities obtained from the diﬀeren-
tiated equation (17). Under RIS we have ΦEx =0 . Notice the diﬀerence between ΦEx and
ΞEx which captures the full general equilibrium interdependence. The solution is then
41obtained as
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where [Γnx] ≡ {I−[ΩnE]·([ΦEn]+[ ΦEx])}
−1 · [Ωnx] is the matrix of general equilibrium
elasticities according to the decomposition in (28). Table A.1 presents [Ωnx], [ΩnE] and
[ΦEn], which allows derivation of the general equilibrium elasticities [Γnx]. The additional
interdependence generated by endogenous expenditure, relative to the simple case of sec-
tion 3 where E is treated as exogenous, i.e. the terms ΩnEΞEx in (28), can then be
identiﬁed by comparing elasticities Γnx with Ωnx.
Given solutions ˆ Wl = ΓWlU ˆ U + ΓWlH ˆ H, l =( h,m,u),w em a yﬁnally turn to native
welfare. Using (11), we write ˆ V = ˆ Y n − β
n ˆ Pn − β
x ˆ Px,w h e r eY n is native income as
deﬁned in (6), and β
n and β
x are budget shares in domestic consumption. These emerge
from (11), invoking Roy’s identity, and normalizing vE =1 .N o t i c et h a ti no u rc a s eg o o d
X is the only tradable good which changes in price. In turn, the change in native income
may be written as ˆ Y n =¯ γh ˆ Wh +¯ γu ˆ Wu +¯ γm ˆ Wm,w h e r e¯ γh = Wh ¯ H/Y n is the share of
native high-skilled labor income in Y n, and analogously for l = m and l = u. Inserting the
above solutions for ˆ Wl we would ﬁnd out that ˆ V =0 , if there are no pre-existing stocks
of foreign labor, H∗ = M∗ = U∗ =0 , which rules out any marginal complementarity
eﬀect, and if there is no terms-of-trade eﬀect. The magnitude of welfare eﬀects from
terms-of-trade changes, if any, depends on the share of exports in Y n. All of this has
already been shown for a much more general case in section 2 above and need not be
reiterated for this special model. For discrete labor inﬂows, complementarity eﬀects do
arise and changes in the non-tradable goods price obtain welfare signiﬁcance, in addition
to the ﬁrst-order terms-of-trade eﬀect. Section 4 which takes a numerical perspective pins
down these welfare eﬀects by means of the usual equivalent variation measure.
42Table A.1: Decomposition of general equilibrium elasticities Γnx = Ωnx + ΩnEΞEx
[Ωnx] [ΩnE] [ΦEn] [ΦEx]
RIS∗ TRS









Z1 0 00 0















(1 − Z2)+Z2 − ανn
¸
1






(1 − Z2) 1 −
η − α
η
















(1 − Z2)+Z2 − ανx
¸
1




x + µσxσn (1 − θ
x)+σxηθ





x + σx (1 − θ
x)
σxη










¯ γu = WuM/E,¯ γm = WmM/E,¯ γh =1− ¯ γu − ¯ γm.
n: endogenous variables, n = Mn,Wh,Wm,Wu. x: exogenous variables, x = H,U. *: [ΦEx]=0for both U and H.
43Table A.2: Calibration and benchmark equilibrium
functional forms quantities prices empirical restriction
and parameters or source
household utility u =( Dx)βx
(Dn)βn
(Dz)βz
e(Px,Pn,Pz,1) = 0.9978 (a)
non-tradable good β
n =0 .5 Dn =0 .4315 Pn =0 .8849 β
n (b); Dn, Pn calibrated
exportable good β
x =0 .25 Dx =0 .1508 Px =1 .2661 β
x (b); Dx, Px calibrated
Dx∗ = Dx∗
0 (Px)−η∗ Dx∗ =0 .1508 calibrated
η∗ =2 taken from Marquez (2002)
imported good β
z =0 .25 Dz =0 .1909 Pz =1 β
z, Pz by normaliz., Dz calibr.
trade-openness (Dx∗Px + Dz)/E =0 .5
technology: nested CES
exportable good Qx = Fx[KxLx(H,Mx)] Qx =0 .3016 Px =1 .2661 calibrated, Qx net of deprec.
med.-skilled wage share θ
x =0 .8489 calibrated
non-tradable good Qn = Fn[KnLn(U,Mx)] Qn =0 .4315 Pn =0 .8849 calibrated, Qn net of deprec.
med.-skilled wage share θ





K =0 .3 based on Backus et al. (1994)
capital-labor-substitution σx
KL = σn
KL =0 .7 based on Abreu et al. (2003)
labor-skill-substitution σx = σn =1 .242 calibrated (c)
GDP (d) Y = PxQx + PnQn =0 .7636 net of deprec.
44Table A.2: Calibration and benchmark equilibrium (continued)
functional forms quantities prices empirical restriction
and parameters or source
capital endowment and allocation
capital, non-tradable sector PnFn
K(·)= ¯ R Kn =1 .5272 ¯ R = i∗ + δ =0 .15 (e) ¯ R speciﬁed, Kn calibrated
capital, exportable sector PxFx
K(·)= ¯ R Kx =1 .5272 ¯ R = i∗ + δ =0 .15 (e) ¯ R speciﬁed, Kx calibrated
foreign capital Kn∗ = Kx∗ =0 assumption
labor endowment and allocation
work force H + M + U =1 normalization
foreign resident workers H∗ = M∗ = U∗ =0 assumption
high-skilled labor H =0 .30 Wh =0 .9853 γh =0 .47 (f)
medium-skilled labor M =0 .40 Wm =0 .6761 γm =0 .43 (f)
M-allocation Mx =0 .03 calibrated
unskilled labor U =0 .30 Wu =0 .2096 γu =0 .10 (f)
(a): e(·) denotes the expenditure function. (b): based on Penn World Tables Mark 6; the implication is that α =0 .5 (share of X-
production exorted). γh: share of high-skilled labor income in aggregate labor income: WhH/(WhH +WmM +WuU); analogously
for γm and γu =1− γh − γm − γk,w h e r eγk indicates the capital income share determined from ¯ K and ¯ R; see above. (c): σn and
σx calibrated to ensure an overall general equilibrium elasticity of substitution between H and U equal to σHU =1 .4;s e eK a t z
& Autor (2000). (d): net of depreciation δK.( d ) :i∗: world interest rate; δ: rate of capital depreciation. (f): labor endowments
H, M and U, as well as wage rates have been calibrated simultaneously, using information on the skill distribution of the labor
force, the functional distribution of wage income (γh,γm,γu)a n daG i n i - c o e ﬃcient equal to 0.26; see OECD (2001). The calibration
procedure is similar in many respects to Davis & Weinstein (2002), a notable diﬀerence being that we use direct estimates for the
export demand elasticity, while D&W infer this paramter from evidence on the terms-of-trade responsiveness to variations in GDP.
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